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Abstract: We consider the polling problem in a social network where respectable participants do care
about their reputation: they do not want their vote to be disclosed nor their misbehaving, if any, to
be publicly exposed. Assuming this reputation concern, we show that a simple secret sharing scheme,
combined with a posteriori verifications, can efficiently enable polling without the need for any central
authority or heavyweight cryptography.
More specifically, we present a scalable distributed polling protocol where (i) misbehaving nodes are
exposed with a non-null probability, (ii) the reputation of honest nodes is never tarnished, and (iii) the
probability of malicious participants violating privacy is traded with their impact on the accuracy of the
polling result. The trade-off is captured by a generic parameter of the protocol, an integer k we call
privacy parameter, so that in a system of N nodes with B <
√
N malicious participants, the probability
of disclosing a participant’s vote is bounded by (B/N)k+1, whereas the impact on the polling result is
bounded by (6k + 2)B.
We report on the deployment of our protocol over 400 PlanetLab nodes with a privacy parameter
k = 2. The polling result suffers a relative error of less than 10% in the face of message losses, crashes
and asynchrony inherent in PlanetLab. In presence of malicious nodes, our experiments show that the
impact on the polling result is (4k + 2)B on average, consistently lower that the theoretical bound of
(6k + 2)B.
Key-words: distributed polling, social networks, privacy, accountability
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1 Introduction
Social networks are growing exponentially, and one of the most celebrated examples, Facebook [7],
currently gathers more than 150 millions active users. Many of these users regularly share images and
videos as well as discuss various social and political matters both with close friends and people they
hardly know. For there is usually a one to one mapping between social network identities and real
ones (as opposed to virtual world platforms such as SecondLife [19]), reputation is a primary concern:
information related to a user is intimately considered to reflect the associated real person.
In this paper, we look at polling, a privacy-sensitive task that might be appealing to trigger from
within a social network, say a French political group on Facebook asking whether Obama would have
been elected in France, or the organizers of a Saturday night party asking whether partners should be
invited too. We consider binary polling: each participant starts with +1 or −1. The goal of the protocol
is to privately and accurately compute the sum of the initial values despite malicious participants trying
to discover votes or bias the computation. Basically, users would not want their vote to be revealed to
other participants, nor do they want the polling to be actually conducted by a central server.1
The motivation of our work is to explore how companion decentralized (server-less) techniques can
leverage reputation in social networks. We claim that privacy and accuracy can be obtained in a dis-
tributed system involving respectable participants by exploiting the very fact that they do care about
their reputation within the social network. We propose an approach which, instead of masking (e.g.,
BFT [1]) or preventing (e.g., using heavyweight cryptography) malicious behaviors, dissuades such be-
haviors. We assume verification schemes, cross-checking information between participants, along the
lines of accountability [21, 10], that may affect their reputation. This triggers malicious nodes to behave
rationally, in the sense that they act as far as their misbehaving is not publicly exposed with probability
1. We prove that using appropriate verifications in accordance with the reputation scheme, a simple
decentralized polling protocol can be made both accurate and private despite the presence of malicious
nodes. The deliberate simplicity of our polling protocol ensures that subsequent verifications can be
easily implemented.
In a nutshell, the protocol works as follows. Participants, clustered in fully connected groups, make
use of a simple secret sharing scheme to encode their vote. Then they send the shares of their vote
(ballots) to proxies, belonging to another group (an office). Each office computes a partial tally that is
further broadcasted to all other groups. Each participant eventually outputs the same tally. The polling
protocol is fully decentralized and does not assign specific roles to any node.2 This results in a simple,
scalable, and easy to deploy protocol. The spatial complexity of the protocol is O(k
√
N) and the number
of messages sent is O(k
√
N), k being the privacy parameter and N the number of participants.
We bound the impact of malicious participants and trade this with the level of privacy ensured. More
specifically, in a system of N nodes with B <
√
N malicious participants3, we can choose any integer k
such that the probability of revealing a participant’s vote is bounded by (B/N)k+1 and the impact on
the result is bounded by (6k + 2)B. This is due to the simple secret sharing scheme enabling to expose,
with probability 1, malicious nodes affecting the outcome more than 6k+2 with only public verifications
i.e., without requiring to reveal the participants’ vote. As we show in the paper, private verifications
expose, with a non-null probability, malicious nodes further (i.e., even if their impact is less than 6k+2),
but require to inspect the content of a subset of ballots. In any case, the reputation of honest nodes is
never tarnished.
To illustrate, consider a system of 10, 000 nodes with 99 malicious nodes (d
√
Ne − 1) and assume a
proportion α of nodes voting +1. Setting k = 1 ensures privacy with probability 99.99% and for any
α > 0.54, 100% of the participants compute the right binary decision (i.e., the sign of the outcome).
While e-voting would require stronger guarantees, this amply fits polling applications requirements.
We report on the deployment of our protocol over 400 PlanetLab nodes with several values of k. The
polling result suffers a relative error of less than 10% in the face of message losses, crashes and asynchrony
inherent in PlanetLab. In presence of malicious nodes, our experiments show that the impact on the
polling result is (4k + 2)B on average, consistently lower that the theoretical bound of (6k + 2)B.
1For instance, every information entered by a Facebook user stays on a Facebook server and may be visible, even after
the user deleted it from her profile and deactivated her account.
2Note that a central entity may be used for bootstrapping or specific verification procedures.
3This is reasonable in sybil-free systems: e.g., Yu et al. presented efficient techniques for preventing sybil attacks in
social networks [23, 22].
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our system model. Section 3 gives
a detailed description of our polling protocol together with an analysis of its characteristics. The impact
of malicious nodes is presented in Section 4 assuming verifications. Experimental results from PlanetLab
are reported in Section 5. Section 6 reviews related work and Section 7 concludes the paper and proposes
perspectives on future work.
2 System Model
We consider a system of N uniquely identified nodes. Each node p votes for a binary value vp ∈ {−1,+1}
and the expected output of the polling algorithm is
∑
p vp. Each participant in the social network is
assigned an integer reputation score, affected by the behavior in the polling protocol.
Nodes can either be honest or malicious. Honest nodes strictly follow the protocol and contribute
to the verifications as long as their privacy is not compromised. More specificaly, honest nodes always
collaborate with verification procedures that do not require them to reveal their vote (i.e., public verifi-
cations).4 Malicious nodes may misbehave either to promote their opinion or reveal the opinion of honest
nodes. Yet, they are rational in the sense that they never behave in such a way that their reputation is
tarnished with probability 1. We consider colluding malicious nodes as a single coalition B (|B| = B).
When malicious nodes collaborate to bias the outcome of the poll, they are assumed to share the same
opinion. Still, they act selfishly in the sense that they prefer protecting their own reputation rather than
covering up their suspected accomplices. For the sake of readability, we consider that the coalition always
promotes -1 in the rest of the paper. Note that a single coalition represents the worst case scenario.5.
We assume a secure channel between every two nodes that maintains the secrecy of messages. More
specifically, a malicious node cannot eavesdrop over the channel to gain information exchanged by others.
Theoretical analysis (Section 3.3) assumes reliable channels and non-faulty nodes. We revisit these
assumptions by measuring the impact of message losses and crashes in the implementation (Section 5)
and by evaluating the impact of crashes in Appendix B.
We assume a cluster-ring-based structure, which could be provided by the social network infrastruc-
ture. The N nodes are clustered into r ordered groups, from g1 to gr. A node p in group gi maintains two
sets of nodes: a set Po of officemates containing all nodes belonging to the same group (Po = gi\{p})
and a fixed-size set Pp of proxies, containing nodes in the next group (Pp ⊆ gi+1). Therefore, all groups
virtually form a ring, g1 being the successor of gr. Each group gi is a clique. We define a client of a
node p, a node for which p acts as a proxy. Every node maintains a list of its clients in the previous
group (Pc ⊆ gi−1). A node discards every message originating from a node that is not in Pc ∪ Po and
can decide when it has received all expected messages. We assume a uniform distribution of nodes ac-
cross the r groups: nodes in the successor groups are distributed uniformly as proxies in the predecessor
group. Therefore, the groups are of similar sizes. In addition, the number of clients |Pc| of all proxies is
approximatively the same, since the proxy views are uniformly distributed and their size |Pp| is fixed.
3 The Polling Protocol
We first give an overview of the polling protocol. Then we prove the correctness of the protocol and
provide a theoretical analysis of its complexity, considering no malicious nodes. Finally, we analyze how
the protocol resists to a privacy attack. Attacks on the outcome of the poll are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Polling in a nutshell
The polling protocol is composed of three phases: (i) voting, (ii) counting and (iii) broadcasting. We
overview these phases in the following. During the voting phase, a node generates a set of ballots
reflecting its opinion and sends each ballot to one of its proxies. In the counting phase, each node in a
group computes the sum of the votes of the nodes in the previous group (local tally). This is achieved
by having each proxy summing up the ballots it received and broadcasting the result to its officemates.
4However, they may refuse to reveal their vote for a verification procedure (i.e., private verification). This is further
discussed in Section 4.2.
5Two or more independent coalitions promoting the same opinion have a greater impact when merged. Several coalitions
promoting opposite opinions have compensating effects.
INRIA
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Finally, the local tallies are forwarded along the ring so that all nodes eventually compute the final
outcome.
Algorithm 1 Polling algorithm at node p in group gi, i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
Input: a vote v ∈ {-1,+1}
Variables: an individual tally t′′ = 0
a local tally t′ = 0
an array of local tally sets S[{1, . . . , r} → ∅]
a local tally array T [{1, . . . , r} → ⊥]
Output: the global tally t̂
Polling Algorithm
1: vote(v, Pp)
2: local_count(t′′, Pp)
3: t′ = t′ + t′′
4: local_tally_broadcast(i, t′′, Pp)
5: t̂ =
∑
i T [i]
Voting phase
procedure vote(v,Pp) is
6: b = v
7: for each proxy ∈ Pp do
8: send [Ballot, b] (proxy)
9: b = −b
10: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [Ballot, b] 〉 do
11: t′′ = t′ + t
Intermediate Counting phase
procedure local_count(t′′,Po) is
12: for each officemate ∈ Po do
13: send [IndividualTally, t′′] (officemate)
14: b = −b
15: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [IndividualTally, t] 〉 do
16: t′ = t′ + t
Local Tally Broadcasting & Forwarding phase
procedure local_tally_broadcast(i, t′′, Pp) is
17: for each proxy ∈ Pp do
18: send [LocalTally, i, t′] (proxy)
19: end for
upon event 〈 receive | [LocalTally, igroup, t] 〉 do
20: S[igroup] = S[igroup] ∪ {t}
21: if (S[igroup] = |Pc|) then
22: T [igroup] = choose(S[igroup])
23: local_tally_broadcast(i,T [igroup])
24: end if
function choose(A) returns local tally is
25: return the most represented local tally in A
+1
-1
+1
gi−1 gi
(a) Voting
gi−1 gi
+1
+1
+1
+3
(b) Intermediate counting
3
+3
-1
+2
+7
gi
(c) Individual tally sharing
+7
+7
+7
gi gi+1
+7
(d) Local tally broadcast-
ing & forwarding
Figure 1: Key phases of the polling algorithm. In Figure 1(a), a node in gi−1 generates 3 (k = 1)
ballots {+1,−1,+1} and sends them to its proxies in gi. Figure 1(b) depicts a node in gi collecting
its received ballots {+1,+1,+1}, and summing them to +3 (individual tally) that it shares with its
officemates in gi as depicted in Figure 1(c). Figure 1(c) also shows that when a node received every
expected individual tallies {−1,+3,+2} it computes and sends the local tally (+7) to the next group
gi+1. Finally, Figure 1(d) shows that when this node sends its local tally (+7) to its proxies, these proxies
forward the local tally to theirs in gi+2.
3.2 Description
3.2.1 Voting
The ballot generation is inspired by the simple secret sharing scheme introduced in [4]. In order to vote
for a given value v ∈ {-1,+1}, a node generates 2k+ 1 ballots {b1, . . . , b2k+1} ∈ {-1,+1} representing its
vote, where k is an integer called privacy parameter. The intuition is to create k + 1 ballots of a given
tendency (positive or negative) and k opposite ballots, resulting, when summed, in a single vote v′ = v.
Each ballot is defined as bj = v if j is odd and bj = −v if j is even, so that v′ =
∑2k+1
j=1 bj = v.
Once a node has generated its 2k+ 1 ballots, it sends each of them to a different proxy. The number
of proxies is to be chosen accordingly, |Pp| = 2k + 1 (for all nodes). Lines 6–9 in Algorithm 1 detail the
voting phase. Figure 1(a) depicts a node sending its 2k + 1 ballots (e.g., {+1,−1,+1}) to its assigned
proxies. Once every node in the system has received one ballot from each of its clients, the voting round
is over.
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3.2.2 Intermediate Counting
A group acts as an office for the preceding group on the ring. The officemates collect ballots from their
clients (Figure 1(b)) and share intermediate results (Figure 1(c)). To this end, a proxy sums the ballots
it received into an individual tally t′′, as described in Algorithm 1, line 11. Once a node has received the
expected number of ballots from its clients, it broadcasts the computed individual tally to its officemates,
as depicted in Figure 1(b) (lines 12–15 in Algorithm 1). The officemates aggregate the received data, i.e.,
they sum each others’ individual tallies and store the result into a local tally t′ as shown in Figure 1(c)
(line 16 in Algorithm 1).
3.2.3 Local Tally Forwarding
Once the intermediate counting phase is over, i.e., all the officemates have computed a local tally, each
node in the group sends its local tally to its proxies (lines 17–19 in Algorithm 1). Upon reception of a
message containing a local tally, a proxy adds it to the set S[i] of possible values for gi. When a proxy
has received the expected number |Pc| of local tallies for a given group gi, it decides on a local tally by
choosing the most represented value in S[i] and stores it in T [i]. When a local tally T [i] is assigned,
it is further forwarded (Figure 1(d)) to the next group using the proxies (lines 20–24 in Algorithm 1).
Local tallies are then forwarded in the system along the ring. When a local tally reaches its source (the
group that emitted it), it is no longer forwarded. The global tally is computed at each node by simply
summing the local tallies of all groups: t̂ =
∑r
i=1 T [i] (line 5 of Algorithm 1).
3.3 Analysis
We analyze the correctness of the polling algorithm and its complexity assuming no malicious nodes.
We then consider the impact of the malicious nodes on privacy. The impact of malicious attacks on the
accuracy of the polling is presented in Section 4 assuming verification procedures.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Assume a system where each node p starts with a binary value vp. The
polling algorithm terminates and each node eventually outputs
∑
p vp.
Proof. (Accuracy) We first prove that the local tally computed in every group gi reflects the vote of all
nodes in gi−1. The local tally computed in a group is the sum of the ballots received by its members.
Each node p in gi−1 sends each of its ballots b1,p, . . . , b2k+1,p to one distinct proxy in gi. Similarly, each
proxy p′ in gi receives a set of ballots Bp′ from its clients. Since we assume no malicious nodes, the set
of ballots sent by the nodes in gi−1 equals the set of ballots received in gi. Therefore, the local tally t′
computed by each member of gi is
t′ =
∑
p′∈gi
∑
b∈Bp′
b =
∑
p∈gi−1
2k+1∑
j=1
bj,p =
∑
p∈gi−1
[(k + 1) · vp + k · (−vp)] =
∑
p∈gi−1
vp .
Note that this follows from the homomorphic property of the simple secret sharing scheme [4]. Since
nodes do honestly forward the local tallies along the ring and the messages are eventually received, each
node ends up with the correct values for the local tallies of every group, thus the correct global tally.
(Termination) A node knows the number of messages it is supposed to receive during each phase. Since
every node sends the required number of messages and every message eventually reaches its destination,
each phase completes. As the polling algorithm is a finite sequence of phases, it is guaranteed to eventually
terminate.
In a realistic scenario, crashes and message losses do occur and may affect the correctness and the
termination. Failures of nodes sending ballots or individual tallies and message losses may (i) affect the
accuracy of the global tally, and (ii) prevent node from detecting the end of a phase or deciding on a
local tally (and thus computing the output). More details are given in Appendix B.
Proposition (Spatial complexity). The asymptotic size S of the state maintained at each node in group
gi is O(r · k + |gi|).
INRIA
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Proof. Every node maintains a set of proxies (2k + 1), the set of its officemates (|gi|) and the list of its
clients (2k + 1 clients on average). Additionally, every node stores a set of 2k + 1 possible values for
each of the r local tallies to perform the global counting, that is S = O(k) +O(|gi|) +O(k) +O(r · k) =
O(r · k + |gi|).
Proposition (Message complexity). The asymptotic average number of messages M sent by a node in
group gi is O(r · k + |gi|).
Proof. A node sends messages during the voting phase (2k+ 1 ballots), the intermediate counting phase
(|gi| − 1 individual tallies), and the global counting phase which involves the dissemination of r local
tallies along the ring using its 2k+ 1 proxies. That is M = O(k) +O(|gi|) +O(r ·k) = O(r ·k+ |gi|).
Note that the parameters are not independent: the sizes of the groups are related and bound to the
number of groups by the relation
∑r
i=1 |gi| = N . Those two quantities are minimized when r = |gi|,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. That is: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r} |gi| = r =
√
N , S = O(k
√
N) and M = O(k
√
N).
Theorem 2 (Privacy). Considering a coalition of B malicious nodes, the probability of violating a node’s
privacy is bounded by (B/N)k+1.
Proof. The vote of a node is revealed if and only if the k + 1 proxies that received the k + 1 ballots
containing the most represented value belong to the malicious coalition. This event occurs with prob-
ability
(
B
k+1
)
/
(
N
k+1
)
. For all k,B and N , this probability is bounded by (B/N)k+1. The bound is tight
for B,N  k.
4 Confining the impact of malicious nodes
In this section, we analyze the impact of malicious nodes on the polling protocol, assuming companion
verification schemes to detect attacks and identify guilty nodes. Detection is performed by the nodes
themselves relying on some of them being honest, and verifications are performed by an external entity
(e.g., the social network infrastructure) polling nodes to identify the guilty ones. These verification
procedures are either sporadic, following real-life tax verification schemes, or triggered by nodes. We
distinguish two types of verifications: (i) public verifications that leverage only information that does
not compromise the nodes’ privacy (i.e., the content of the ballots they sent), such as the individual
tallies received from their officemates, and (ii) private verifications that may leverage every information
logged by the nodes including the content of the ballots.
To dissuade nodes from misbehaving, verifications must affect the reputation of the involved nodes.
Initially, every node in the system is assigned the same reputation score (given in reputation units, ru).
When an attack is detected and reported, the neighbors (i.e., the nodes it communicates with, typically
clients and proxies) of the accused nodes are polled for the messages they exchanged. The reputation
of the involved nodes is affected as follows: if the inspected node confesses the action that was reported
as suspect (i.e., confirms the testimonies of its neighbors), then only its reputation is decreased by 1 ru.
Otherwise, the reputation of both involved nodes is decreased by 1 ru.
We consider an overlay of
√
N groups of size
√
N (
√
N ∈ N) and a perfect client/proxy matching,
i.e., each node has exactly the same number (2k + 1) of clients and proxies.
Assuming honest nodes give priority to privacy over accuracy, we focus in a first step on bounding
the impact of colluding malicious nodes when using only public verifications. Then, considering also
private verifications, we prove that colluding nodes compromising the global tally within the bound may
be caught with a non-null probability. We then discuss independent malicious nodes.
4.1 Impact of a malicious coalition under public verifications
Theorem 3. For B <
√
N , each member of a malicious coalition may affect the global tally up to 6k+2.
Proof (structure). The proof relies on the facts that (i) the honest nodes always tell the truth and strictly
follow the protocol (including detections and verifications), and (ii) malicious nodes do not behave in such
a way that their reputation is decreased with probability one. Effectively, showing that the attacks with
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unbounded impact are detected by the honest nodes with probability 1 proves the theorem. A malicious
node may bias the protocol at all three phases. Lemmas 3.1-3.4 encompass all possible attacks, propose
a detection scheme relying on honest node, and bound the impact of those that cannot be detected
with probability 1. In addition, if an attack is detected, we prove that the guilty node is exposed by a
public verification. Summing the maximum impacts of all these attacks (Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2) for each
malicious node gives a maximum impact (2k + 2(2k + 1)) = (6k + 2) on the global tally.
Note that the proof relies on the assumption B <
√
N to ensure that the malicious can neither
“control” (there is at least one honest node in each group) nor “fool” an entire group without being
detected (i.e. there are not enough malicious node to both perform and cover malicious actions). In fact,
the weakest assumption needed is ∀i, |gi ∩ B|+ |gi+1 ∩ B| <
√
N .
Lemma 3.1 (Voting). A malicious node can affect the global tally up to 2k, when voting.
Proof. Due to the overlay structure, a node can only send ballots to the proxies it is assigned (otherwise
the ballots are discarded), i.e., a maximum of 2k + 1 ballots. Therefore a malicious node may affect the
global tally by either (i) sending less ballots than it is supposed to or by (ii) sending more than k + 1
-1-ballots. In the worst case, the malicious node sends 2k + 1 -1-ballots. Since a node is allowed to
send only a set of ballots that sums to −1 or +1, its maximum impact is 2k. Note that this attack can
be only detected by inspecting the content of the ballots sent by the malicious node, this is a private
verification.
Lemma 3.2 (Computing individual tallies). There exists a public verification scheme so that, if a
malicious node modifies its individual tally by more than 2(2k+ 1), the attack is detected with probability
1 and the node is exposed.
Proof. The considered overlay structure ensures that any node has exactly 2k+1 clients and thus receives
2k + 1 ballots during the voting phase. A malicious node can modify its individual tally by inverting
the +1-ballots it received, i.e., it turns them in -1-ballots, decreasing its individual tally accordingly.
In addition, a malicious node can also forge ballots. While the first attack cannot be detected with-
out inspecting the content of the ballots themselves, the latter is identified by its honest officemates
with probability 1 if the individual tally is out of the range [−(2k + 1), 2k + 1]. Therefore, not to be
publicly detected, a node corrupting or forging ballots must output an individual tally in that range.
Consequently, the worst case occurs when a malicious node receives 2k + 1 +1-ballots and inverts them
all when summing them, leading to a maximum impact of 2(2k + 1). When verified, a malicious node
outputting an individual tally out of the range is automatically exposed.
Lemma 3.3 (Broadcasting individual tallies). There exists a public verification scheme so that, a mali-
cious node broadcasting inconsistent copies of its individual tally to honest nodes, i.e., sending different
values to its honest officemates, is detected with probability 1 and the node is exposed.
Proof. Before deciding on a local tally, every node broadcasts to its officemates the set of individual
tallies it received. This way, a honest officemate trivially detects the inconsistency. Malicious nodes are
exposed when their neighbors are asked for the individual tallies they received from these nodes.
Note that a malicious node has no incentive not to broadcast its individual tally since it would be
publicly detected, whereas sending an individual tally of 0 would have the same impact on the computed
local tally while not being publicly detectable. However, broadcasting different individual tallies may
help a malicious node to impose an arbitrary value for the local tally. For instance, assume a proxy
has 5 clients, i.e., k = 2, only two of them being malicious. In that case, there is a majority of honest
nodes. Consequently, if the honest nodes send the same local tally, it will be the one chosen by the
proxy. However, if the malicious nodes send different values as their individual tallies then honest nodes
will compute different local tallies. The proxy will then decide on the arbitrary local tally sent by the
malicious nodes.
Lemma 3.4 (Forwarding local tallies). There exists a public verification scheme so that, a group for-
warding inconsistent copies of a local tally, i.e., nodes sending different values to their proxies, is detected
with probability 1 and the malicious nodes are exposed.
INRIA
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Proof. An inconsistent local tally forwarding is detected assuming the following: before deciding on a
local tally, a node broadcasts the set of received local tallies to its officemates. An inconsistency is
detected if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: (C1) a honest node received different local
tallies from its clients, (C2) a honest node received different local tallies than its officemates. Consider j
malicious nodes concentrated in a group gi forwarding an incorrect local tally to their proxies. Because
of (C1), the clients of a honest node in gi+1 must all be malicious. Since the number of clients of all
nodes equals their number of proxies (2k + 1), a coalition of j malicious nodes can corrupt a maximum
of j proxies. Therefore, the
√
N − j remaining proxies in gi+1 must collude with the coalition in gi to
circumvent (C2). To conclude, not to be detected, such an attack requires j malicious nodes in gi and√
N − j malicious nodes in gi+1, that is a minimum number of
√
N malicious nodes. A malicious node
in gi can be exposed by a public verification scheme since it broadcasted a local tally that does not
correspond to the sum of individual tallies it received. A malicious node in gi+1 can be exposed by a
public verification scheme since it has broadcasted a different local tally from the one it received.
Theorem 3 shows that the protocol trades accuracy for privacy. Effectively, the privacy parameter k
adjusts accuracy and privacy in opposite directions. Increasing the number of messages to represent a
vote, i.e., increasing k, gives an opportunity 6k+ 2 to each malicious node to corrupt the outcome of the
result. Conversely, the probability of a vote to be disclosed decreases following (B/N)k+1.
4.2 Private verifications
So far we only considered public verifications, i.e., where the content of the ballots is never disclosed.
Assume now that the nodes accept, with a non-null probability, to relax privacy for the sake of verifica-
tions and reveal a subset of the ballots they sent and/or received. Then, this partial information can be
leveraged to detect the malicious behaviors described in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Theorem 4. There is a non-null probability to expose a malicious node when misbehaving, even if its
impact is less than 6k + 2.
Proof. Regarding the voting phase, a malicious node that sent k + 1 + j +1-ballots and only k − j
-1-ballots (1 ≤ j ≤ k) is unable to provide, for both kinds, the id of k − j + 1 proxies to which it sent a
-1-ballot. Therefore, a simple verification is to ask the suspected node to provide a list of proxies that
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+1
+1
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+1
+3
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p1
p2
+1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+3
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Figure 2: Malicious nodes have no gain in covering up each other.
can testify it sent at least j′ ballots of each kind, for a random value j′ ranging from 1 to k. Note that
an inspected node can disclose j′ = k without revealing its vote. Regarding the ballot corruption attack,
partial information about the ballots received by the inspected node can be leveraged to refine the bound
on its individual tally: assume the inspected node received nb ballots, if we further know that it received
at least n+b +1-ballots and n
−
b -1-ballots, then the range is refined from [−nb, nb] to [−nb+2n+b , nb−2n−b ].
In both the aforementioned verifications, a malicious node has no interest in covering up another one.
Consider the examples depicted in Figure 2 where a malicious node p1 is the client of a malicious node
p2. In the case represented in Figure 2(a), if p1’s vote is verified and p2 covers p1 up, i.e., it testifies
p1 sent a -1-ballot, it exposes itself to a private verification on its individual tally (note that a node
has to be consistent from one verification to another, thus, if the vote of p2 is further verified, p2 must
stick to its first version about the ballots it received). The same situation occurs in the case depicted in
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Figure 2(b): if p2’s individual tally is verified and p2 covers p1 up, i.e., it testifies it sent a -1-ballot to
p2, it puts itself at risk, should it be subject to a private verification on its vote.
Since malicious node are selfish, they never cover up malicious nodes when privately verified. In
conclusion, relaxing privacy ensures that every malicious node has a non-null probability to be exposed.
Theorem 5. The reputation of honest nodes is never tarnished.
Proof. The reputation of a honest node p1 can only be decreased by two means: (i) a node p2 falsely
accuses p1, or (ii) a node p2 accused by p1 does not confess its illegal action. Since a honest node always
tells the truth, both cases occur only if p2 is malicious. The first situation neither increases the interest
function of p2 nor decreases the final result of the poll. The second situation decreases the reputation of
p2 by 1 ru with probability 1 and p2 is not cleared for any other verifications even so. Since p2 is rational,
it never behaves in such a way. Therefore, the reputation of a honest node is never tarnished.
4.3 Impact of independent malicious nodes
So far we considered that malicious nodes collude to achieve their common goal. However, when malicious
nodes are independent, the proposed protocol can be refined as follows: the members of each group gi
share a binary secret mi ∈ {−1, 1}. When voting, a node modulates the ballots it sends by multiplying
each of them by mi. The secret of each group is revealed only when the poll is over. This limits the
interest of corrupting ballots/tallies, the impact being unpredictable. Nodes determine the global tally
by computing
∑
imiT [i] (note that the outcome of the poll remains correct since the sum of the sum of
modulated ballots is equal to the modulated sum of the original ballots). As an example, a malicious
node in group gi being a proxy for nodes in gi−1 knows the modulation mi but ignores the modulation
mi−1 of its clients, therefore, when corrupting the ballots, it cannot know what impact it will have on
the final result. A malicious node can only predict the impact of the ballots it sends, i.e., when the node
votes. Its impact is therefore limited to 2k. This mechanism cannot work when malicious nodes collude
since they could tell each other the shared secret of their respective groups.
5 Implementation
The goal of the evaluation is to assess the algorithm against the presented theoretical bounds, and the
impact of relaxing the assumptions made for the sake of the analysis. Our experiments show that, in
a practical setting, (i) our polling protocol suffers only as low as 10% in accuracy, and (ii) the average
impact measured for given sizes of coalition is around 4k ·B.
5.1 Experimental setup
In this section we report on the deployment of our polling algorithm on a 400 PlanetLab nodes testbed.
This enables to stretch the algorithm in a real world setting, (i) in the presence of message losses, crashes
and asynchrony inherent in PlanetLab, and (ii) when attacking the protocol by introducing malicious
nodes. We evaluate our algorithm with two different privacy parameter values k = 1 and k = 2.
5.1.1 Overlay
The cluster-ring-based overlay is built using a centralized bootstrapping entity that keeps track of the
whole set of nodes, assigning each node to a random group using the hashes of their ids. Nodes have
exactly 2k + 1 proxies in the next group and the number of clients of a node is (2k + 1) |gi−1| / |gi| on
average. Note that although we opted for a centralized overlay construction algorithm (e.g., the social
network infrastructure could handle this task), we believe it can be achieved with the help of Fireflies
building blocks [11] to prevent malicious nodes to concentrate in groups (which we have shown is of the
utmost importance for privacy) and Kelips [8] in order to create groups of similar sizes. Other DHT-based
approaches could also provide similar properties [18, 15, 20].
INRIA
Decentralized Polling With Respectable Participants 11
5.1.2 Communication and Asynchrony
Nodes communicate through UDP which may lead to message losses on the communication channels (on
the PlanetLab testbed, we observed a loss rate ranging from 5% to 15%). In addition, PlanetLab nodes
are unreliable leading to expected messages to be lost due to senders crashes. Therefore, in practice,
phase terminations cannot be detected by simply counting the number of received messages. To address
this issue, all phases are bounded in time, except the local tally forwarding phase. In this phase, when
the number of possible values for a local tally of a group grows beyond a given threshold γ · |Pc|, the
node schedules the decision on this particular local tally in ∆t seconds. In our implementation, γ is set
to 0.5 and ∆t to 5 seconds.
5.2 Polling in practice
5.2.1 Accuracy
Figure 3 depicts the accuracy of the polling algorithm among 400 PlanetLab nodes with k = 2. Fig-
ure 3(a) considers the value of the tally while Figure 3(b) considers the sign of the tally. Without loss of
generality, we consider a proportion α of node voting +1 ranging from 0.5 to 1. In Figure 3(a), we plot
the average standard deviation on the computed tally for α in that range. For each run, we compute the
average of the error when computing the tally (this is the difference between the tally on each node and
the real one) over all nodes. Each point represents the average of this value over 20 independent runs.
Note that the accuracy increases when α is close to 0.5. This is due to the fact that the closer the tally
to 0.5, the less message losses impact the outcome: the closer the number of -1-ballots and +1-ballots,
the closer to 0 the individual and local tallies.
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Figure 3: Accuracy of the algorithm in presence of asynchrony, message losses and failures.
Figure 3(b) displays the fraction of nodes deciding on the correct sign of the tally depending on
α (dashed line). Effectively, even if the standard deviation is relatively small, some nodes may decide
incorrectly on the sign of the outcome. Consider the organizers of a Saturday night party asking their
friends in a social network whether partners should be excluded. As depicted in Figure 3(b), for α =
52.5%, some nodes would compute a different answer than the majority. This means that a minority of
participants computing a negative result would come with their partners. . . Figure 3(b) (plain line) also
shows the proportion of nodes that are unable to decide on a global tally (because their set of possible
values never reach the threshold γ). We observe that this fraction remains very low (less than 4%) and
is independent from α.
The impact of message loss varies depending on the phase of the polling protocol. During a voting
phase, there is no recovery of ballots a priori. Note that the impact on the final outcome of a single
ballot is limited to 1. From the intermediate counting phase onwards, the impact may be greater as
ballots are aggregated. Yet, the impact is limited by the natural replication inherent in broadcast within
and between groups. For this reason, the proposed algorithm intuitively suffers less than raw population
protocols [2] or tree-based protocols for aggregation.
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5.2.2 Malicious Attacks
We evaluate the protocol in the presence of a coalition of B malicious nodes that bias the outcome of
the polling result in an attempt to decrease the final outcome. We consider the worst case: malicious
nodes do every possible attack that does not compromise their reputation with probability 1, i.e., every
malicious node (i) sends 2k + 1 -1-ballots, and (ii) inverts every +1-ballot it receives. Figure 4 displays
for k = 1 and k = 2, the resulting tally (sign on the upper part of the figure and value on the lower
part), compared to the real one (dashed line), for B = 19 malicious nodes (B = d
√
Ne−1) in a 400 node
system.
We observe that, as expected, the impact of the malicious nodes is greater for k = 2 than for k = 1.
Effectively the higher k, the better privacy can be preserved but the higher the impact of malicious
nodes. We observe that the malicious coalition affects the outcome of the poll within the theoretical
bound derived in the analysis (dotted lines in Figure 4). However, the average impact of the coalition
is less than 2k + 2(2k + 1) = 6k + 2 (considering the worst case where the malicious proxy receives
only +1-ballots and inverts them all). The theoretical bound is never reached as the average impact
of a malicious node depends on the actual number of ballots it can invert, this, in turn, depends on α.
Effectively, a malicious proxy receives k + α +1-ballots out of 2k + 1 on average. Therefore, its impact
is 2k + 2(k + α) = 4k + 2α on average. For k = 2, fitting our 55 data point cloud with a least-squares
regression line (plain line in Figure 4) a(α − 0.5) + b gives a = 791 and b = −163. This is close to the
expected parameter values a = 2(N −B) = 760 and b = −B(4k+ 1) = −180. See Appendix A for more
details. We use this analysis to make a projection on larger scale systems. For k = 1 (Figure 4(a)), every
node of the poll outputs a valid binary results when α > 0.62, which is to be compared to α > 0.55
observed in Figure 3(b) (without malicious nodes). Note that the threshold decreases with N . On
average, we can analytically derive that with N = 10, 000 and B = 99, the proportion α for which the
nodes decides correctly is α > 0.52.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
n
o
d
es
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
T
al
ly
α
6k + 2
Valid binary output
Average outcome
Expected outcome
(a) k = 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
n
o
d
es
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
T
al
ly
α
6k + 2
Valid binary output
Average outcome
Expected outcome
(b) k = 2
Figure 4: Accuracy of the poll in presence of malicious nodes: with N = 400 and B = 19 malicious nodes
manage to confuse the majority of the nodes for (a) α < 0.62 when k = 1, and (b) α < 0.73 when k = 2.
6 Related Work
We discuss here related distributed protocols which involve neither cryptography nor security scheme
based on intractability of mathematical computations. Similarly to most protocols without cryptography,
our work ensures privacy via secret sharing techniques. Also, our solution distances itself from related
work in the sense that no participant has a special role (following the peer-to-peer paradigm), resulting
in an increased scalability and robustness.
A large amount of work on secret sharing schemes (introduced by Rivest et al. in [16]) has been
published in the late 80’s. In [3], Benaloh proposed a scheme for sharing secrets privately based on
polynomials. Benaloh’s scheme relies on the homorphic property of addition, to implement polling.
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However, a malicious participant can easily corrupt the shares, thus potentially significantly impacting
the final outcome.
Assuming a majority of honest participants, Rabin and Ben-Or extended Benaloh’s secret sharing and
proposed verifiable secret sharing scheme (VSS) [14]. Based on VSS, they proposed a private multiparty
protocol to compute the sum of the participants’ inputs. Beyond the fact that these techniques assume a
fully connected network, synchronous links and broadcast channels, they involve higher mathematics. In
addition they present a major drawback when applied to distributed polling. Effectively, although VSS
allows to compute privately the verifiable sum of the participants’ inputs with an exponentially small error
on the output, there is no control over the inputs themselves. More specifically, a malicious participant
may share an arbitrarily high value and can thus affect the outcome in a potentially unbounded way
(more precisely, the inputs are in a finite field Zp where p is a prime number greater than N , thus they are
bounded but can be greater than N). The strength of the protocol is to ensure privacy to participants,
including the malicious ones. This makes such a scheme hardly suitable for polling applications. Note
that this also applies to complex secret sharing scheme and private multiparty computation such as
AMPC [13].
In [12], Malkhi et al. proposed an e-voting protocol based on AMPC and enhanced check vectors.
While powerful, this protocol differs from our work since participants have distinct and predefined roles
(dealers, talliers, and receivers). This may result in decreased scalability and robustness if specific
nodes fail. Nonetheless, these design choices are fully justified by the requirements inherent in E-Voting
applications, such as democracy, verifiability, and unconditional accuracy. Instead polling applications
can relax such constraints for the sake of simplicity.
In a sense, our work also relates to distributed ranking schemes. The principle of ranking is similar to
polling, in that a participant evaluates the quality of one of her peers by (i) locally grading its behavior
(input value), and (ii) collecting the local grades assigned by the rest of the system. However, to the
best of our knowledge, most published work [9, 17] has focused on designing accurate grading mechanism
rather than providing efficient polling schemes. In [6], Dutta et al. evoke grading freeriders and take into
account possible collusion. However, none of the proposed ranking schemes provide a global polling, as
grading generally relies on polling only a subset of nodes (peers usually collaborate with a small part of
the network). In addition, privacy is usually not addressed in such schemes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a simple decentralized polling protocol and proved that it can be made
private and accurate in presence of malicious nodes concerned over their reputation (as members of
social networks do) by means of verification procedures. This opens the way to a novel and promising
way to perform secure distributed computations.
In addition we believe that our work can be extended to distributed applications that are not critical
(i.e., that are not sensitive to small deviation on their outcome). We plan to demonstrate the feasibility of
decentralized polling of respectable participants by deploying our system to a large scale social network.
A natural and interesting perspective is the extension of our polling protocol to n-ary inputs providing
doodle-like services[5].
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A Average impact of malicious nodes
There is a proportion α of nodes voting +1. Therefore the expected final tally is αN − (1 − α)N =
N(2α − 1). When voting, nodes voting +1 (resp. -1) share their vote in k + 1 +1-ballots and k -1-
ballots (resp. k + 1 -1-ballots and k +1-ballots). Therefore, proxies receive a +1-ballot with probability
α · (k + 1)/(2k + 1) + (1− α) · k/(2k + 1) = (k + α)/(2k + 1). Since a proxy receives on average 2k + 1
ballots, the average impact of a malicious proxy promoting -1 is 2(2k + 1) · (k + α)/(2k + 1) = 2k + 2α.
In addition, a malicious node can affect the tally by 2k when voting. Therefore, a malicious node can
bias the protocol by 2k + 2k + 2α = 4k + 2α on average. Considering a coalition of B malicious node,
the expected tally is thus N(2α− 1)−B(4k + 2α) = 2(N −B)(α− 0.5)−B(4k + 1).
B Impact of crashes
Crashes can have two very different impacts on the system. First, nodes may crash independently before
sending unique information. This refers to data they received, that did not yet get replicated, typically
initial shares of votes. Loosing such data affects the global tally. Second, several nodes may be crashed
at given time. This may result in other nodes unable to decide on a local tally and thus on the global
tally from a lack of corroborating pieces of information. In the following, we analyze the impact of the
first type of crashes on the outcome. We then give the probability that the second situation arises.
Impact of individual crashes Consider a node that crashes before broadcasting its individual tally
to its officemates. This individual tally is lost, and is the sum of the |Pc| = 2k + 1 ballots sent by its
clients (assuming perfect client/proxy matching). The impact of such a crash is bounded by 2k+1 and is
(2α− 1) on average (assuming all groups have an equal size). Moreover, if a node crashes while sending
its ballots, it affects the global tally by up to k (if the node crashes after sending its k + 1 identical
ballots). The maximum impact of an individual crash is thus 2k + 1 + k = 3k + 1.
Probability of simultaneous crashes Assuming nodes crash with probability c, there is a probability
di for a node p ∈ gi not to decide on the local tally of group r. This can happen if more than (1−γ) |Pc| =
(1−γ)(2k+1) clients do not send the local tally because they either crash or have not decided on the local
tally. We define ei as the probability for a node in gi not to send a local tally. We have ei = c+ (1− c)di
and
di =
γ(2k+1)−1∑
j=0
(
2k + 1
j
)
(1− ei−1)j · e2k+1−ji−1 and d1 = 0 .
A node does not decide on the global tally if it has not decided on at least one local tally. This happens
with probability dr (if the further tally can be forwarded, so does the others). For k = 2, r = 20 and
c = 5%, the probability for a node not to decide on the global tally is 2%.
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